

DOES FREEDOM STOP TERROR? ■ GOLF COURSES AS ART

APRIL 11, 2005

# The American Conservative

## SEE YOU IN 2008

**How the GOP Exploits Social Conservatives**



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## REPUBLICANS FOR ROEMER

My wife and I would like to express our thanks for the nice piece on Tim Roemer entitled, "No Choice in Pro-Choice" that appeared in the March 14 issue of *TAC*.

Mr. Roemer was our congressman in the 3rd District of Indiana until he retired (much to our sorrow because we have a neocon now) to pursue other interests.

We are Goldwater Republicans, but we found in Mr. Roemer a pro-life, independent-thinking Democrat. This congressman bolted from party leaders to vote against NAFTA because he believed that it lacked protections for American workers.

We are sorry for the Democratic Party. Mr. Smith came to Washington and they missed him.

JAMES AND BETTY MOULD  
*Mishawaka, Ind.*

## WHEN IN ROME

With regard to Pat Buchanan's "Stillborn Empire" (March 14), some years ago—the 1970s I think—*National Review* printed a letter or short article that made a very similar comparison of the U.S. and the Roman Empire. Of course, *NR* has changed since then.

The point was that a Roman born sometime in the late 4th century would have lived (had he or she lived a reasonably long lifetime) to see Rome go from a secure empire to decline to the destruction of the city itself. The fall of the Roman Empire, while gradual, was not imperceptible.

Similarly an American like myself, born in 1950, has lived to see this once great country go from near unchallengeable power to risky military adventures to dangerous economic policies. It would be not unreasonable to expect a catastrophe by the time I'm approaching old age. The idea that a gradual decline and fall is so slow that it can't be seen or felt didn't apply to the Romans, and we won't evade it either.

LEONARD MARTINO  
*via e-mail*

## SWING FOR THE FENCE

I have to say every time I receive my latest issue of *TAC* I am amazed at how you guys nail it. I keep saying, "Well, they've really outdone themselves this time. There is no way they will be able to be this good next time." But you are!

I savor the time spent reading the articles. How do you guys continue to hit it out of the park each and every time? Just incredible.

BILL COLOHAN  
*via e-mail*

## NOT QUITE MARXISTS

Robert Locke's condemnation of libertarianism ("Marxism of the Right," March 14) begs the comment "perhaps he doth protest too much." There are roughly 50 million liberals, 53 million conservatives, and about 40 libertarians who don't all vote. Beating them up in print is like driving over into the next county to run over a snake reported to be in the road.

As a recovering Libertarian myself, I spent a campaign for the Texas Senate trying to hide behind the potted plants when my party colleagues started their rant about the rights of four-year-olds to possess heroin or automatic weapons.

I think that the libertarian wave probably crested in 1992. Calling them Marxist is a tad harsh. Most libertarians don't advocate gulags for disagreement and wouldn't have the state move extra families into your house at the point of a gun. They do however allow us to have guns just in case some Marxists show up.

PHILLIP J. HUBBELL  
*Carrollton, Texas*

## SMEAR CAMPAIGN

What exactly have libertarians done for Robert Locke to smear us so? Marxists? That makes no sense at all. Neither does the rest of his article. From the second sentence: "Libertarianism offers its believers a clear conscience to do things society presently restrains, like make more money, have more sex, or take more drugs." For the record, a person's

fiscal, sexual, and consumption habits are entirely his own business, as long as he does not harm others. In fact, the beauty of libertarianism is that it is morally consistent. But Locke apparently wants veto power over what goes on in your business and bedroom.

Many libertarians oppose aggressive war, the death penalty, and abortion, but Locke makes no mention of that. Maybe because he wants to kill more Arabs and dope fiends than we do.

"Society is dependent upon inculcated self-restraint if it is not to slide into barbarism, and libertarians attack this self-restraint." Wrong. Locke is the one attacking self-restraint. Libertarians believe fervently in the superiority of self-restraint over restrictive, freedom-smashing laws. Laws don't do anything about "drunkenness, drugs, failure to hold a job, and pregnancy out of wedlock," and arguably make these things worse.

Clearly, Locke isn't interested in having a dialogue with libertarians but simply wants to smear and smash them.

VINCE DALIESSIO

*via e-mail*


## Robert Locke responds:

1. If libertarianism applies to politics but not to ethics, then it can't say anything about right and wrong.
2. A lot of libertarians don't really defend libertarianism. They defend "libertarianism-plus," i.e. libertarianism plus Christian values, plus America's founding tradition, plus common sense. Fine, but this isn't libertarianism as such.
3. All the sins of statism don't actually make libertarianism true.
4. Rejecting libertarianism isn't the same as rejecting freedom.

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[MIDEAST]

## NUKES FOR BREAKFAST

*Roll Call* recently reported that at a pancake breakfast at the United Methodist Church in Sun Creek, Texas, Congressman Sam Johnson (R-Texas) described how he had advised President Bush that “Syria is the problem” because Saddam Hussein had spirited away his weapons of mass destruction there. Johnson’s solution was to load up an F-15 with two nuclear weapons and “we won’t have to worry about Syria anymore.” The audience roared with applause. Johnson didn’t say how Bush took the advice.

It’s difficult to get our minds around the fact that congressmen are now advising the president to make nuclear attacks against countries that have never posed the slightest threat to the United States, and that (in church yet) audiences approve of the idea. It mitigates slightly that Johnson later claimed he was joking.

The call for an unprovoked nuclear strike drew no notice from the national networks or press, which apparently found it unsurprising that a Republican congressman would speak this way. The big moral voices of the “conservative” movement—which worked up a high froth of outrage when Trent Lott, at a tribute to retiring centenarian Strom Thurmond, made some kindly reference to Thurmond’s Dixiecrat campaign of 50-odd years ago—apparently found nothing troubling about a congressman’s calls for nuclear sneak attacks on the ancient city of Damascus.

Some might conclude that the Republican Party and the conservative movement have been driven crazy by the heady cocktail of war and nationalism. For our part, we won’t speculate on what hundreds of millions of supposedly about-to-be democrats in the Arab world might conclude, but we can’t imagine it would help to our real national interests.

HAVING BASED RECENT DECISIONS ON “INTERNATIONAL OPINION” AND “NATIONAL CONSENSUS,” WHAT DO YOU MAKE OF THE CONSTITUTION?



MIKE LESTER WWW.CAGLECARTOONS.COM

[LANGUAGE]

## POLYGLOT PLEDGE

Running a world empire when you can’t speak a foreign language is not easy. So perhaps administrators at Old Mill High School in Millersville, Md., were trying to be patriotic—in the David Frum, global-hegemony sense—when they decreed that the Pledge of Allegiance would be recited in Spanish, French, Latin, Russian, and German (*achtung!*) during National Foreign Language Week. Alas, one student, 15-year old Patrick Linton, didn’t think so, and he’s raised a ruckus. “This is America, and we got soldiers at war,” he told the *Baltimore Sun*, “When you’re saying the Pledge in a different language which nobody understands, that’s not OK.”

Tell it to Max Boot. Last month he had the bright idea that foreign soldiers could be enlisted into the U.S. military to make up for recruiting shortfalls caused by the Iraq War. “Call it the Freedom Legion. As its name implies, this unit would be modeled on the French Foreign Legion ... U.S. citizenship would be part of the ‘pay.’ And rather than fighting for U.S. security writ small—the way the Foreign Legion fights for the glory of France—it would have as its mission defending and advancing freedom across the world.” A polyglot Pledge might be just the thing for Boot’s Freedom Legion—especially if one of its languages is Newspeak.

[CULTURE]

## HERE COMES PARTY B

Ontario continues to revise its legal code to conform to the logic of same-sex marriage, legalized in the province nearly two years ago. The latest move has been a bill that goes through 73 statutes and excises references to “husband,” “wife,” “widow,” and “widower” and replaces them with less gender-specific terms. “Mother” and “father” can’t be far behind. Indeed, a federal bill that would allow same-sex marriage throughout Canada would systematically replace “natural parent” with “legal parent.”

If you think it could never happen here, you haven’t been paying attention. One of the first innovations to follow Massachusetts’s judicially imposed same-sex marriage was a change in the state’s marriage licenses to replace “bride” and “groom” with “Party A” and “Party B.”

These are more than just words. The gay-marriage juggernaut removes useful shared social norms, like fatherhood and motherhood, from our cultural lexicon. It does not just extend an old institution to an excluded few; it rewrites the basic assumptions and purposes of marriage for everyone throughout society. By capriciously changing a fundamental social institution essential to rearing the next generation, we risk losing the very language of marriage.

[MEDIA]

## PUBLIC INTEREST, RIP

We learned with sadness that the *Public Interest*, a quarterly that was once the flagship journal of neoconservatism, is closing its doors. Anyone curious as to how this tendency initially appealed to many intelligent people would do well to spend some time browsing the online archives of this journal, founded by Irving Kristol and Nathan Glazer. Its focus was a rigorous examination of the effects of Great Society domestic legislation, with a frequent emphasis on the phenomenon of unintended consequences.

That's not the kind of project that attracts the big neoconservative donors today—they prefer putting money into newspapers, magazines, and blogs that promote ambitious and aggressive foreign policies, with consequences that no one can possibly foresee. Perhaps there is an organic connection between the neoconservatism of the early 1970s—which at the time seemed a cautious and prudent persuasion—and the warmongering, open-borders advocacy that makes up neoconservatism of today, but its workings are a mystery that might long puzzle future historians.

[ECONOMICS]

## OWNERSHIP SOCIETY

Warren Buffett has made billions betting against the dollar, but that doesn't mean the greenback's fall makes him happy. Far from it. While taking advantage of Washington's ineptitude, Buffett has warned anyone who will listen that America's trade deficits, the cause of the dollar's plunge, are turning us into a nation of serfs. "A country that is now aspiring to an 'ownership society' will not find happiness in—and I'll use hyperbole here for emphasis—a 'sharecropper society,'" he recently wrote to Berkshire Hathaway shareholders.

He sees storm clouds gathering in the form of ever-rising interest pay-

ments to America's overseas creditors (chiefly Japan and China). "This annual royalty paid the world, which would not disappear unless the US massively underconsumed and began to run consistent and large trade surpluses, would undoubtedly produce significant political unrest in the US" if left unchecked, he wrote. Buffett's term for these payments is apt: "tribute for the over-indulgences of the past"—and the present, we might add.

[TAXES]

## READ MY LIPS, PART II

If you are keeping a running tally of conservative principles being jettisoned by today's Republican Party, low taxes may be the next item to add to the list. The *Washington Post* reports that tax cuts aren't on the 2005 agenda. Any tax reform will be aimed at simplification rather than lower rates. Senate Republicans have proposed allowing some of President Bush's tax cuts to expire—including the 2003 capital-gains and dividends tax cuts the administration touts as a catalyst for economic growth.

This is a hole Bush and the GOP have dug for themselves. By recklessly boosting spending, they have made tax-hikers appear fiscally responsible. Refusing to confront the deficit on the spending side of the equation all but guarantees that it will be dealt with through higher taxes.

[SPORT]

## BENCH CONGRESS

Before convening a joint session to debate the designated-hitter rule, Congress might reread its job description. While revelations of rampant steroid use dishearten and baseball's unwillingness to self-govern disappoints, news that the House of Representatives is using its power to subpoena ballplayers reveals a deeper problem: our overseers consider no area of American life outside the scope of their authority. ■

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# Is Protectionism Racism?

“Xenophobia and Politics”—the headline got my attention. And the subhead convinced me I would get honorable mention: “Why Protectionism is a Lot Like Racism.”

I was not mistaken. But the main target of Steven Landsburg’s “On My Mind” column in *Forbes* magazine was the neo-racist ideas he had ferreted out—on John Kerry’s website.

Kerry had proposed, “Federal contracts, wherever possible, should be performed by American workers.” Landsburg was morally offended that anyone would argue that American workers should be given preference over Asian or African workers.

“It’s not just Kerry,” wrote the professor from the University of Rochester. “Both major parties (and most of the minor ones) are infested with protectionist fellow travelers who would discriminate on the basis of national origin no less virulently than David Duke or any other overt racist would discriminate on the basis of skin color. But if racism is morally repugnant—and it is—then so is xenophobia...”

Declares Landsburg: “I hold this truth to be self-evident: It is just plain ugly to care more about total strangers in Detroit than about total strangers in Juarez. ... Even if Kerry-style (or Nader-style or Buchanan-style) protectionism could improve Americans’ well-being at the expense of foreigners, it would still be wrong.”

Now I do not know what parents pay to send their kids to the University of Rochester. But if the philosophical imbecility of Landsburg is representative of the faculty, it is too much.

To be more concerned about the well-being of one’s fellow Americans is not

“xenophobia,” which means a fear or hatred of foreigners. It is patriotism, which entails a special love for one’s own country and countrymen, not a hatred of any other country or people. Preferring Americans no more means hating other peoples than preferring one’s family means hating all other families. An icy indifference as to whether one’s countrymen are winning—be it in a competition for jobs or Olympic medals—is the moral treason and the mark of a dead soul.

We are all born into families, clans, tribes, neighborhoods, countries, all of which—as well as the friends we make, the schools that nurture us, the churches at which we worship—have a claim upon our love and loyalty.

But the professor equates “Buy American” and “Hire Americans” programs with aggressive war. “After all, if it’s okay to enrich ourselves by denying foreigners the right to earn a living, why not enrich ourselves by invading peaceful countries and seizing their assets. ... Stealing assets is wrong, and so is stealing the right to earn a living, no matter where the victim was born.”

The professor’s piece testifies to another truth. Free-trade fanatics are running out of statistical proofs so fast they must defend their position on the grounds that, no matter if it fails America, it is a morally superior position. For look at what a soaring dependency on imports is doing to our country.

Last year’s trade deficit topped \$617 billion. In January, it hit \$58.3 billion,

portending a deficit in 2005 of \$700 billion. U.S. trade and budget deficits combined are 10 percent of GDP. We are borrowing \$2 billion a day abroad to subsidize our lifestyle. The American consumer has never been more indebted—in credit cards, auto loans, mortgages.

The dollar has lost a third of its value against the euro in three years. Gold is back close to \$450 an ounce, a run-up of 70 percent. Oil is bumping up against \$55 a barrel. When South Korea and then Japan’s Koizumi hinted their treasuries might diversify reserves and hold a lesser share in dollars, the Dow experienced what pilots call, as you grab the arm rests and hold on for dear life, “a little choppiness.” The last fruits of free-trade globalism may be financial collapse.

Under Bush, 2.8 million manufacturing jobs, one in six, have been lost. Real wages of working Americans are stagnant. Two-thirds of a million textile and apparel workers face wipeout from Chinese imports that are now unrestricted. As Paul Craig Roberts writes, the jobs being created pay less and demand less in education and training than the jobs being outsourced. Our workers are being sacrificed on the altar of globalism. Says Landsburg: tough luck!

If economics professors are so fanatic about free trade, why not eliminate their tenure and import English-speaking economics professors from India at half the pay? For as Landsburg instructs us, “It is plain ugly to care more” about him than a total stranger.

Moreover, the stranger might come to love America and even prefer America, which some deracinated academics find so racist a sentiment. ■



[focus on the family?]

# Republican Stepchildren

Message to social conservatives: Thanks for the votes. We'll call you in four years.

By W. James Antle III

THERESA FLEMING is charmingly ebullient as she rattles off the names of co-operative state legislators who have met with her and her colleagues. The Strongsville mother of two is the director of the Moms for Ohio political action committee, with allies in both parties. "The insurance industry, the health care industry, people with interest in tax issues, they are already organized politically," she says. "Moms needed a voice for issues that affected our children."

Asked if this makes her a soccer mom, she quickly agrees. "We're all soccer moms," Fleming says. "We take our kids to soccer, baseball, basketball, swimming, and everything else." But the issues that motivate her are almost exactly the opposite of what most political analysts mean when they use the phrase. She isn't a swing voter turned off by social conservatism; instead, she is committed to the right to life, the battle against same-sex marriage, and keeping the words "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance.

It was voters like Fleming who gave George W. Bush Ohio and, by extension, a second term. Many like-minded people across the country volunteered on Republican campaigns and turned out on election day, helping the GOP win key races and increase its congressional majorities. They also succeeded in passing constitutional amendments affirm-

ing the traditional idea of marriage as a union between a man and a woman in 11 out of 11 states.

While some of the post-election chatter about values voters was exaggerated, the designation describes a real and growing electoral phenomenon. According to the Pew Research Center, nearly four out of five white evangelical Christians supported President Bush in 2004, representing more than a third of all ballots cast for him. When traditionalist Catholics and members of other conservative religious communities are factored in, it becomes clear that the voters usually lumped together under the banner of the Religious Right form the largest single constituency of today's Republican Party.

As the euphoria from November begins to fade, however, some conservative Christians are starting to ask hardheaded questions about how much clout they are getting in return for their stalwart support. Pro-choice moderate Sen. Arlen Specter (R-Pa.), rescued from a pro-life primary challenge by Bush and his state's conservative GOP junior Sen. Rick Santorum, has ascended to the Senate Judiciary Committee chairmanship. He offered cultural conservatives conciliatory rhetoric when this position appeared to be in jeopardy, but upon assuming the gavel he has reverted to type.

The gay-marriage debate, where social conservatives saw their greatest successes in 2004, has been the source of even larger disappointments. Both the White House and the congressional Republican leadership have assigned a much lower priority to a constitutional amendment preventing same-sex matrimony—believed by many on the Right to be the only way to stop the Massachusetts Supreme Court decision from being replicated nationally—than to reforming Social Security and the tax code. Even before the election, Bush indicated some flexibility on civil unions. "I don't think we should deny people rights to a civil union, a legal arrangement," he said in a televised interview, "if that's what a state chooses to do..."

In January, many pro-family leaders decided it was time to voice their frustration. The Arlington Group is a loose network of socially conservative organizations that meet to collaborate on strategy. Participants sent Bush advisor Karl Rove a notably blunt letter. "We couldn't help but notice the contrast between how the President is approaching the difficult issue of Social Security privatization where public opinion is deeply divided and the marriage issue where public opinion is overwhelmingly on his side," the activists wrote. "Is he prepared to spend significant political capital on privatization but reluctant to

devote the same energy to preserving traditional marriage?"

Contrary to some press reports, the statement stopped short of threatening to withhold support from the president's Social Security initiative unless he stepped up his lobbying on the federal marriage amendment. Instead, the Arlington Group conservatives "respectfully request" that Bush "spend his political capital on the issue of the preservation of marriage just as he intends to do on other priorities." But it was surprisingly tough criticism—describing the White House's stance on gay marriage as "passive" and "defeatist"—from some of the president's strongest supporters. The signatories of the letter comprise a virtual Who's Who of Christian Right leaders—Gary Bauer, Paul Weyrich, Tony Perkins, and James Dobson. Dobson has been particularly pointed: "If Republicans do what they've done in the past,

Neither goal was realized. While moral conservatives got access and sympathetic presidential speeches, they had little impact on public policy. The Reagan administration's signature conservative achievements include enduring reductions in marginal tax rates and winning the Cold War. While most religious conservatives supported and obviously benefited from both accomplishments, the items of particular importance to them are conspicuous by their absence from this list.

Reagan did sign executive orders curbing federal funding of abortion and many of his judicial nominees believed *Roe v. Wade* was wrongly decided, although not enough to build an anti-*Roe* majority on the Supreme Court. But constitutional amendments banning abortion and reinstating school prayer went nowhere. Reagan, like Bush today with the federal marriage amendment, often

men, such as Oklahoma Republicans Steve Largent and J.C. Watts, were themselves evangelicals. Pro-lifers had an even better election than Republicans—no pro-life incumbent of either party was defeated that year by a pro-choice challenger. But even then, the party leadership shelved many of their concerns. The only items in the vaunted Contract with America that were designed to appeal to them were promises to strengthen child pornography laws, cut taxes for families with children, and include anti-illegitimacy provisions in welfare reform. No major social issue—not even one with broad public support, like restoring school prayer or banning partial-birth abortion—was listed in the contract.

Even some on the Left are beginning to argue that the GOP's appeal to social conservatives might be something of a shell game; Republicans employ pro-life and pro-family rhetoric to win elections but don't deliver once in office. In *What's the Matter With Kansas?* Thomas Frank wrote, "Historians often attribute the withering and disappearance of the nineteenth-century Populist movement to its failure to achieve material, real-world goals... Yet with the pro-life movement, the material goal of stopping abortion is, almost by definition, beyond achieving."

The crux of Frank's argument is that conservatives have avoided debates about socioeconomic class by appealing to Middle America's sense of cultural embattlement. This helps them win middle-class votes by appearing to identify with the moral values of people whose economic interests might be better served by voting Democratic. Once in power, Frank contends, the Republicans cannot address these social issues because they would lose their ability to appeal to these voters once these grievances are removed from the debate.

**ONCE IN POWER, FRANK CONTENDS, THE REPUBLICANS CANNOT ADDRESS THESE SOCIAL ISSUES BECAUSE THEY WOULD LOSE THEIR ABILITY TO APPEAL TO THESE VOTERS ONCE THESE GRIEVANCES ARE REMOVED FROM THE DEBATE.**

which is say, 'Thanks so much for putting us in power: now we don't want to talk to you any more,' they will pay a serious price."

As this warning suggests, some veterans of the Religious Right feel a sense of having been here before—they vote in large numbers for GOP candidates, but to little effect. The other players in the big tent end up getting to set the agenda. Christian conservatives were first a major factor in national politics during the Moral Majority years of the 1980s. Many of them hoped that by electing Ronald Reagan and a Republican Senate, they could at least roll back the cultural liberalism of the 1960s and at best help usher in a spiritual reawakening.

endorsed them in speeches but in retrospect some question whether he did enough to promote their passage. Also like Bush, he only addressed pro-life marches by telephone.

The Religious Right rebounded in the 1990s, and Ralph Reed was a major figure in its revival. Reed's strategy was to mainstream Christian conservatives within the Republican Party—getting them elected to leadership positions alongside establishment regulars—and to work in tandem with the other elements of the conservative movement.

He can claim some results. Religious conservatives contributed mightily to the 1994 Republican takeover of Congress. Many of the high-profile fresh-



You don't have to endorse the entirety of Frank's argument to acknowledge one point he raises: social conservatism has brought people into the Republican Party with lower incomes than the party's traditional base, some of whom are more economically moderate and less hostile in general toward activist government than other conservatives. Reihan Salam, writing in the *Los Angeles Times*, has referred to the "crisis of 'Sam's Club' Republicans."

In addition to marriage and abortion, Moms for Ohio lists pocketbook issues that affect the family as major concerns, including job losses caused by global trade. "If we are going to say we are compassionate conservatives, we have to mean it," Fleming says. "And it is impossible to help others unless we stay strong ourselves." One pro-family volunteer notes the "scandal of World War II veterans having to board a bus to Canada to get affordable prescription drugs."

These differences have been bridged in the past by the conservative consensus that libertarian means can achieve traditionalist ends. In the 1990s, Grover Norquist began making the argument that social conservatives were a part of the Right's anti-statist "Leave us Alone" coalition: "Conservative leaders can meet in a room, and the taxpayers can agree not to throw condoms at the children of Christians and orthodox Jews; the gun owners can agree not to raise everyone else's taxes; the Christians can agree not to steal anyone's guns; and they all can agree not to take anyone's property."

Even back then fissures were apparent. Supply-siders never warmed to the \$500-per-child tax credits; although popular with pro-family groups, they did not enhance work incentives by lowering marginal rates. Then House Budget Committee Chairman John Kasich (R-Ohio), who eventually became a supporter of the credits, once half-jokingly

described them as a sop to "greedy Christians."

Tensions aside, many social conservatives remain optimistic about their prospects with Republicans controlling both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue, and Bush personally has a tremendous reservoir of goodwill to tap among the grassroots. "I think we need to give the president the benefit of the doubt on marriage and other issues," says Carrie Gordon Earll, a senior policy analyst at Focus on the Family. "Wherever he has had the opportunity, he has seized it.

People I speak to are encouraged." Fleming agrees: "I think the president won re-election based on issues like marriage. I hope he delivers, and I believe he will."

"Pro-family groups are the locomotive on this train," Earll emphasizes. "We need to be the ones pushing to keep our issues on the table."

This much is clear: religious conservatives have won their place in the GOP's big tent. They will be watching carefully to see how the ringmasters perform. ■

[war in error]

# Does Freedom Prevent Terrorism?

Isn't it pretty to think so ...

By James L. Payne

FIGHTING TERRORISM has come to be the justification for much of what government does these days, particularly in the Bush administration's campaign for freedom and democracy. "The only force powerful enough to stop the rise of tyranny and terror," said President Bush in this year's State of the Union address, "is the force of human freedom." Last August, Bush explained his thinking on how to fight terrorism: "I believe that democracy can take hold in parts of the world that are now non-democratic, and I think it's necessary in order to defeat the ideologies of hate."

In the abstract, a formulation that marries such positive concepts is appealing. Freedom is a good thing, democracy is a good thing, and putting

an end to terrorism would also be a good thing. But empirically, does the relationship hold? Is it true that in free and democratic countries terrorism doesn't occur?

Let's start with the United States. Since the mid-1960s, this country has seen, by my count, 16 domestic terrorist organizations, including the Symbionese Liberation Army, the Black Panthers, the Jewish Defense League, the Weather Underground, the Posse Comitatus, the Omega-7, the May 19th Communist Coalition, the Covenant, the Aryan Nations, the Earth Liberation Front, and Puerto Rican groups including the Macheteros and the FALN. The Weather Underground alone was responsible for some 800 bombings from 1969-72,

including explosions at the University of Wisconsin Center for Mathematical Sciences, a U.S. Senate office building, and the Pentagon. In addition to the organized groups, we have seen individual terrorists, including Ted Kaczynski, the ardent environmentalist whose letter bombs killed three and injured 29, and Timothy McVeigh, who, with the aid of Terry Nichols, killed 167 in the Oklahoma City bombing.

Just about every other democracy has suffered from indigenous terrorists: Britain has had the IRA and Ulster Freedom Fighters (10,000 bombings, 3,000 killed); Basque terrorists in Spain were killing over a hundred people a year in 1979 and 1980; the Red Brigades in Italy have been responsible for thousands of incidents, including the grisly kidnapping and murder of former premier Aldo Moro; Germany had its Baader-Meinhof gang; Japan has had three terrorist organizations; France has seen two. Terrorists have sprouted up in most of the democracies of Latin America, including Chile, Brazil, Argentina, Peru, and Uruguay. Colombia, the country with the longest record for freedom and democracy in South America, also holds the record for the largest, longest-running terrorist organization, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia. Founded in 1964, the FARC has over 10,000 armed combatants and has committed thousands of atrocities, including a car bombing of a Bogota nightclub in 2003 that killed 30 people.

The theory that freedom prevents terrorism doesn't work for Muslim countries either. Turkey and Indonesia are among the most democratic Muslim countries, and both face serious domestic terrorist organizations. Indonesia has the Jemaah Islamiya, responsible for the bombing at the Jakarta Marriott Hotel as well as the Bali bombings that killed over 200. Turkey is practically a Wal-

Mart of terrorist groups. There are at least eight Islamic terror groups, seven Kurdish organizations, and seven that are Marxist. These terrorist groups have killed thousands of people in recent decades.

Does democracy really prevent the growth of "ideologies of hate," as the president alleges? When I first noticed

THE IDEA THAT FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY **PREVENT THE RISE** OF LIKE FASCISM, COMMUNISM, OR **RADICAL ISLAM** GOES AGAINST THE EVIDENCE.

that claim, I immediately thought of the classic ideology of hate, the fascism of Adolf Hitler. Where did that vicious movement grow up? In the flowering of freedom and democracy of Germany's Weimar Republic, 1919-1933.

One could say that in Iraq the president has contrived a direct experiment of his theory. Iraq today is freer and more democratic than it was under Saddam Hussein. Are there fewer terrorists there now?

The idea, then, that freedom and democracy prevent the rise of vicious political movements like fascism, communism, or radical Islam goes against the evidence. It also goes against political theory. If anything, freedom promotes or at least enables the growth of violent partisan groups, because it provides an opportunity for extremists to organize and proselytize. The point was perhaps first made by founding father James Madison over two centuries ago in *Federalist* number 10 in discussing the causes of "the violence of faction." As he put it, "Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly expires."

If spreading freedom and democracy won't prevent terrorism, what can we do that will have a useful effect? It's a difficult question; the following is one possible, partial answer.

We can start with the observation that extremist movements all seem to need a vivid enemy, a belief in a sinister force intent on destroying all that is good and true. To the terrorist, the extreme evil of this enemy justifies his use of extreme violence to combat it. Much of terrorist ideology dwells on conspiracy theories that supposedly explain how and why

this monstrous foe operates. These theories may be more or less convincing. When they are vague or easily contradicted by obvious facts, they don't serve very well to help terrorists recruit for their cause. The more clearly the enemy stands out as an obvious and guilty malefactor, the more numerous and more motivated the terrorists will be.

For example, for the Marxist-Leninists of yesteryear, the devil was the capitalist class. Capitalists were held to seek the exploitation and oppression of working people, relying on their devious control of every aspect of society: politics, culture, and so on. The problem was that when workers were content with their jobs, this image didn't fit the facts very well. Sometimes Marxist leaders would try to make the world fit Marxist theory better. They would push unions into violent strikes and thus provoke bloody clashes between workers and security forces. These clashes would help to radicalize workers. "See," said the Marxist leaders, "how vicious and oppressive the capitalists are!"

In a similar fashion, Muslim terrorists are motivated by a belief in a sinister oppressor. For them, the demon is the West, especially the leader of the West, the United States, sometimes referred to by the radicals as "the Great Satan." The U.S., they believe, is using diverse and

devious means to destroy Muslim religion, culture, and society. There are many strands to this conspiracy idea. Muslim leaders point to American cultural imports of movies, music, and magazines that seem to be undermining traditional Muslim religious and social values. They point to its Christian religion. They point to American companies that introduce western styles of dress and consumer goods.

These points are rather diffuse evidence for the evil intentions of the United States, however. They don't create the vivid picture of oppression that is needed to fire up recruits to the terrorist cause. To radicalize the population, the Muslim terrorists need exactly what the Marxist labor leaders needed: the actual show of physical force by the enemy. When the "oppressors" act out the role of oppressors in steel and blood, then you have a persuasive picture of a real enemy.

Time after time, terrorist movements in the Mideast have been galvanized by the intrusion of western military forces into these countries. As University of Michigan history professor Juan Cole puts it, "It's obvious that it [Muslim terrorism] comes out of a reaction to being occupied by foreigners." He points to the early example of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, which grew up in reaction to British occupation in the 1940s. This organization grew to half a million members in 1948 and was responsible for numerous assassinations of British officials and Egyptian politicians.

In more recent times, the United States has played this role of military intruder in the Muslim world. Lebanon is one example. We have sent troops there twice—1958 and 1983—thus helping to make that country a hotbed of Islamic terrorism. Other American military interventions include Somalia in 1992-94, as well as air strikes against Libya in 1987, and cruise missiles against the Sudan in 1998.

In 1990, the United States stationed troops in Saudi Arabia, Islam's holy land. One person who was shocked and radicalized was Osama bin Laden, who later said that this move completely transformed his perspective. His reaction of disgust and anger took him to Afghanistan to organize a *jihad* against America. The rest, as they say, is history. Did Pentagon planners have the slightest inkling of this kind of danger when they stationed American troops in Saudi Arabia?

Then there is Iraq. As we just noted, it flatly contradicts President Bush's theory that the extension of democracy and freedom damps down terrorism. It clearly supports the idea that the introduction of American troops into a Muslim country generates it. In the first weeks after the American victory, there was practically no terrorism and only a handful of combatants. Today there are hundreds of violent actions every week and thousands of terrorists.

If U.S. policymakers want to limit the

growth of Muslim terrorism, they need to be very careful about sending troops to Muslim trouble spots. There may be times, like the case of Afghanistan, when this is absolutely imperative, but one still pays a price. The Muslim world community has over one billion people. Probably something like 100 million of these are naïve, impressionable youths capable of being recruited to the Islamic terrorist cause. If ill-considered American troop deployments cause just one-tenth of one percent of these youngsters to conclude that the United States is an oppressive monster bent on subjugating the Muslim world, that will mean something like 100,000 more terrorists for the U.S. to deal with. ■

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# Jacobin in Chief

Exporting the French Revolution to the world

By Claes G. Ryn

EVER SINCE 9/11, the president of the United States has been urging the use of American power to spread the allegedly universal principles of "freedom and democracy" throughout the world. On his recent European tour President Bush solicited the support of Europe in this cause, saying, "our ideals and our interests lead in the same direction."

What that direction is had been tellingly indicated just a few days earlier by Condoleezza Rice. Speaking in Paris,

she said that the founders of the American and French republics were inspired by the same values, a statement that implied common origins in the same revolutionary spirit. Though historically wholly erroneous, this view was consistent with the ideology that the administration has enunciated. It should by now be obvious that, in his foreign policy views at minimum, the president of the United States is no conservative. He is a Jacobin nationalist.



Inspired, guided, and supported by the ubiquitous neoconservatives, President Bush has adopted and fostered an ideologically charged missionary spirit that bears a striking resemblance to that of the Jacobins who led the French Revolution. The principles of “freedom and democracy” are to be promoted around the world by virtuous American power. The French Jacobins, too, saw themselves as virtuous champions of universal principles, “freedom” and popular rule prominent among them.

After the president’s inaugural address, his ensuing news conference, and his State of the Union address, no doubt can remain about how he views America’s role in the world. To advance freedom and democracy is, he said, “the mission that created our nation.” At the news conference he added, “I look forward to leading the world in that direction.” In the State of the Union speech he pointed to “the road of Providence” and said, “we know where it leads: it leads to freedom.”

The neoconservatives have transformed the old American exceptionalism, which counseled isolation from the world, into an assertive, ideologically intense nationalism, whose smugness seems to know no bounds. The president has long asserted that America’s values are for all people. “There is a value system that cannot be compromised, and that is the values we praise. And if the values are good enough for our people, they ought to be good enough for others.” In the State of the Union address he claimed, “we live in the country where the biggest dreams are born.” He and America are called to enact the will of Providence.

That a particular leader or country could be identified with God’s purpose is a notion alien to the mainstream of the Christian tradition, which insists that humans are fallen beings. Their knowledge is, at best, imperfect. Though

statesmen, like others, should try to make room for the spirit of God by trying to purge themselves of tainted motives, not even a person of pure motive could in the infinitely complex reality of politics claim to have discerned God’s will for the world. None of this has deterred the president, who exhibits just the kind of pride against which the older western tradition—both classical and Christian—warned.

“Freedom” and “democracy” can mean radically different things. The president, his secretary of state, and their neoconservative idea-men have connected them with the Jacobin faith. The French Jacobins were followers of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who argued, “man was born free, but he is everywhere in chains.” For men to be liberated, inherited societies and beliefs had to be destroyed.

The French Revolution was an attempt to enact his ideas. The Jacobins dealt harshly with “evil,” guillotining conspicuous representatives of the old order and employing a general ruthlessness

impulse, which is what would be expected from a conservative, but to help define America’s pursuit of freedom. He could not more clearly have aligned himself with Jacobinism. One wonders whether the president or his speechwriters understand that, rhetorically at least, he has adopted a faith that created some of history’s most monstrous regimes.

Today communism has collapsed, but another universalist ideology, the new Jacobinism, has taken its place. A difference between the French and the new Jacobinism is that the latter has chosen not France but America as mankind’s savior.

In a large number of speeches and statements since 9/11, the president has made clear that he considers armed world hegemony necessary to America’s mission. At the inauguration, the massive security—involving some 30,000 secret service agents, police, and military personnel—and other telltale symbolism signaled the invincibility and willpower of the United States. Here

**NEOCONSERVATIVES HAVE TRANSFORMED THE OLD AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM, WHICH COUNSELED ISOLATION FROM THE WORLD, INTO AN IDEOLOGICALLY INTENSE NATIONALISM, WHOSE SMUGNESS SEEMS TO KNOW NO BOUNDS.**

ness that culminated in the Terror. To France was assigned the mission of liberation. Europe and other parts of the world were thrust into protracted war.

In 1980, James Billington, the Librarian of Congress, used the phrase “fire in the minds of men” as the title for a book about the revolutionary faith. This faith would unsettle the entire Western world and eventually spawn the Communist Revolution of 1917. In his second inaugural address, the president used the same phrase, “fire in the minds of men,” not to reject this

was installed an American emperor, but one far more powerful and far more ambitious than any Roman counterpart. Neo-Jacobin ideology can be seen as the perfect justification for American imperial power.

Praising the president’s inaugural address, neoconservative foreign-policy analyst Robert Kagan wrote in the *Washington Post* that America should pursue timeless “universal aspirations.” Fighting terrorism was “too narrow, too limited” as a “paradigm for American foreign policy.”

After the implosion of the Soviet Union, the neo-Jacobin neoconservatives argued that America should use its status as the lone superpower to spread its principles. They demanded “moral clarity” in U.S. foreign policy. Good stood against evil. After 9/11, Bush became their chief spokesman. He committed the United States to what he calls “the global democratic revolution.” The war against Iraq, he said, was “the first step” in that revolution. There has been not even a hint in the president’s recent speeches that the Iraqi debacle and the tens of thousands of dead and maimed have made him question his own virtuous nationalism.

Rarely has an ideology been so strongly entrenched in a country’s opinion-molding establishment. Especially with regard to foreign policy, the new Jacobinism is strongly represented in virtually all leading American media outlets. In the press, this is particularly true of the *Wall Street Journal*, but the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, *Newsweek*, *Time* and *U.S. News and World Report* all give it more than a hearing. Among the opinion magazines, the *Weekly Standard* is its main voice, but on foreign-policy issues at least, it also dominates formerly more conservative magazines like *National Review*.

In the commentariat, neo-Jacobin thinking is today challenging an older, more diffuse and less vigorous liberalism for pre-eminence. It is omnipresent in the think tanks, especially those emphasizing foreign policy and national security. Its brain-center is the American Enterprise Institute. On television, the Rupert Murdoch-owned Fox News Channel pushes the neoconservative foreign-policy line most conspicuously and reliably, but it flourishes on all the networks and major cable channels. By presenting itself on the radio waves and elsewhere as a form of kick-butt Americanism, neo-Jacobinism has also

acquired millions of foot soldiers among flag-waving Americans.

What goes curiously unnoticed is that, despite their label, the neoconservatives think of themselves as representing a progressive, revolutionary force. The America they champion is not the America of history with its deep roots in a European and English past. In theory, they have constructed their own America, which represents a radical break with history.

“To celebrate America is ... to celebrate revolution,” writes professor Harry Jaffa, a leading disciple of Leo Strauss, whose admirers are spread throughout the Bush administration. The American Revolution in behalf of freedom may appear mild “as compared with subsequent revolutions in France, Russia, China, Cuba, or elsewhere,” Jaffa notes, but “it nonetheless embodied the greatest attempt at innovation that human history has recorded.”

Another leading neoconservative, Michael Ledeen, who first came into view as an advisor on national security in the Reagan White House, openly portrays the America with which he identifies as a destroyer of existing societies. According to Ledeen, “Creative destruction is our middle name, both within our society and abroad. We tear down the old order every day. ... Our enemies have always hated this whirlwind of energy and creativity, which menaces their traditions. ... [We] must destroy them to advance our historic mission.”

Some of the most prominent neoconservatives caught the revolutionary spirit when they were still Marxists, and despite their “second thoughts” they still harbor a deep desire for remaking the world according to a single model, their model. One of the reasons they are now fond of capitalism is that, like Marx, they conceive of it as an effective destroyer of traditional elites and societies.

According to Irving Kristol, the reputed godfather of neoconservatism,

today’s United States is “ideological, like the Soviet Union of yesteryear.” His son William insists that for America vigorously to promote its universal principles abroad, it must have great military and other governmental might. The old conservative suspicion of strong, centralized federal government must be abandoned. According to the elder Kristol, it has been the role of neoconservatism “to convert the Republican party, and conservatism in general, against their wills,” to this new conception of government.

To call people who are attracted to the new Jacobinism “neoconservatives” reveals profound confusion. Modern conservatism was born in opposition to Jacobin universalism. The father of conservatism, Edmund Burke, was an English liberal, a Whig, who was very friendly to the American colonists; he thought they had strong traditional grounds for challenging king and Parliament. What Burke argued passionately against, by contrast, was the French Revolution and Jacobin thinking, which he saw as expressing an unhistorical, tyrannical spirit and an importunate desire for power. Burke warned specifically against “liberty” in the abstract.

Like Burke, the Framers of the U.S. Constitution associated liberty with particular inherited traditions, limited, decentralized government, checks on power, self-restraint, moderation, and a willingness to compromise. Jacobin “freedom,” by contrast, justifies unchecked imperial power.

That is the “freedom” for which George W. Bush has become the most prominent advocate. ■

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*Claes G. Ryn, professor of politics at the Catholic University of America, is chairman of the National Humanities Institute and the author of America the Virtuous: The Crisis of Democracy and the Quest for Empire.*

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# Anatomy of a Hed Headline

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# Fairway to Heaven

Golf course architecture may be the great unheralded WASP art form of the 20th century.

By Steve Sailer

GOLF COURSE ARCHITECTURE is one of the world's most expansive but least recognized arts. Yet this curiously obscure profession can help shed light on mainstream art, sociology, and even human nature itself, since the golf designer, more than any other artist, tries to reproduce the primeval human vision of an earthly paradise.

Hidden in plain sight, golf courses are among the few works of art readily visible from airliners. Assuming an average of a quarter square mile apiece, America's 15,000 golf courses cover almost as much land as Delaware and Rhode Island combined.

The philosophy of golf architecture isn't terribly elaborate compared to the thickets of theory that entangle most museum arts, but one thing all golf designers assert is that their courses look natural. Growing up in arid Southern California, however, where the indigenous landscape is impenetrable hillsides of gray-brown sagebrush, I never quite understood what was so natural about fairways of verdant, closely-mown grass, but I loved them all the same.

Research since the early '80s has shown that humans tend to have two favorite landscapes. One is wherever they lived during their adolescence, but the nearly-universal favorite among children before they imprint upon their local look is grassy parkland, and that fondness survives into adulthood.

In one study, people from 15 different cultures were asked what they'd like to see in a picture. Then the researchers would paint the average of what they were told. Even though the scientists hadn't mentioned what type of picture it should be, the consensus in 14 of the 15 cultures favored landscapes. All over the world, people want to see grassland, a lake, and some trees, but not a solid forest. And they always want to see it slightly from above. In fact, they came up with terrain that looked rather like the view from the par 5 15th fairway at Augusta National, site of the Masters Tournament each April, where players must decide whether to attempt to fly the pond in front of the green below them with their second shots in the hopes of putting for an eagle.

The current theory for why golf courses are so attractive to millions (mostly men) is that they look like a happy hunting ground—a Disney-version of the primordial East African grasslands. Harvard biologist Edward O. Wilson, author of the landmark 1975 book *Sociobiology*, once told me, "I believe that the reason that people find well-landscaped golf courses 'beautiful' is that they look like savannas, down to the scattered trees, copses, and lakes, and most especially if they have vistas of the sea."

Tasty hoofed animals would graze on the savanna grass, while the nearby

woods could provide shade and cover for hunters. Our ancestors would study the direction of the wind and the slopes of the land in order to approach their prey from the best angles. Any resemblance to a rolling golf fairway running between trees is not coincidental.

To create these pleasure grounds, top golf architects typically spend over \$10 million per course, and because designers oversee the creation of multiple layouts simultaneously, a "signature" architect like Tom Fazio will end his career with his name on a few billion dollars worth of golf courses.

Famous works of "environmental art," such as Robert Smithson's monumental earthwork "Spiral Jetty" in the Great Salt Lake, are dwarfed by golf courses in extent and thought required. Among museum artists, only Christo works on a comparable scale, and his projects, such as his recent "Gates" in Central Park, are more repetitious. Nonetheless, Christo's "Gates," which re-emphasized the original landscape architect Frederick Law Olmstead's lovely serpentine pathways, and his 1976 "Running Fence" snaking through the undulating grasslands of Marin County, offer some of the same visual pleasures of following alluring trails that golf architects provide.

The great majority of golfers long thought of courses mostly in terms of length or difficulty rather than of

artistry. Even though the taste of golfers has improved in recent decades, many still judge a course more by the manicuring of its grass than by its design. Moreover, in the U.S., few women are interested in golf before menopause, although the game is fairly fashionable among young women in East Asia and Scandinavia.

In recent decades, however, the golf world has come down with a severe case of connoisseurship, publishing hundreds of coffee-table books and calendars, making cult figures of long-forgotten '20s architects like A.W. Tillinghast and brand names out of living designers like Pete Dye and Tom Doak.

This frenzy of art worship among a minority of golfers has gone almost wholly unrecognized in the establishment art world, which otherwise has been so quick to discern artistry in such unlikely forms as graffiti and toilet brushes. Top museums do not stage retrospectives on the Trent Jones family or stock golf course photo-books in their gift shops.

The art community would benefit from exposure to golf architecture simply because the best courses, such as Alister MacKenzie's Cypress Point on the Monterey Peninsula, are things of astonishing beauty, comparable in craftsmanship, complexity, and deceptiveness to the finest efforts of 18th-century English landscape artists such as Capability Brown, creator of the majestic grounds for Blenheim Palace.

The first problem limiting the acceptance of golf design as art is that to non-golfers, a course can seem as meaningless as a Concerto for Dog Whistle. That a golf course allows people to interact with interesting landscapes without killing wild animals makes sense in the abstract, but not until you've driven a ball over a gaping canyon and onto the smooth safety of the green will the golf course obsession really resonate.

Sociology also separates the worlds of art and golf. Conventional artists are urban, golf architects suburban. The art community delights in the venerable game of Shock the Bourgeoisie, while golf courses are too bourgeois to be hip, too elegant to be camp.

Many of the creators, critics, and collectors who have so enriched the arts are male homosexuals, while golf, for whatever reason, has almost no appeal to gay male sensibilities. On the other hand, the Ladies Professional Golf Association's Nabisco Championship in Palm Springs has become one of the largest annual lesbian get-togethers in the United States, but lesbians tend not to be interested in the classic visual arts, and, indeed, are often resentful of the prestige of Dead White European Male artists.

At a time when art institutions are fixated on celebrating demographic diversity, the golf-architecture business remains white (even the golf-mad Japanese frequently import English-speaking designers), male (the woman with the largest influence on architec-

Golf architecture might have been the great WASP art form of the 20th century—indeed, it's arguable that the decline of the WASP ascendancy stemmed in part from too much time spent on the golf course. The overwhelming majority of prominent architects have been of British, especially Scottish, descent. Fazio is one of the very few golf architects whose name ends in a vowel. Amusingly, Fazio's detractors often discuss his lovely but not all that strategically interesting courses using much the same terminology as a 19th-century Scotsman might have employed to dismiss an Italian artist: flashy but not fundamentally sound.

Two major novelists, P.G. Wodehouse and John Updike, have written about golf at length, and the golf sportswriter Bernard Darwin was a prose stylist of comparable distinction. But golf doesn't attract as many literary intellectuals as baseball does. Golfers tend to overlap with football fans—typically, businessmen with a talent for getting things done but not terribly reflective.

**ART WORSHIP AMONG GOLFERS HAS GONE UNRECOGNIZED IN THE ESTABLISHMENT ART WORLD, WHICH OTHERWISE HAS BEEN SO QUICK TO DISCERN ARTISTRY IN SUCH UNLIKELY FORMS AS GRAFFITI AND TOILET BRUSHES.**

ture has been Pete Dye's wife, Alice), and intensely nepotistic (most prominent names in the business today are either champion golfers, such as Jack Nicklaus and Ben Crenshaw, or the male kin of architects, such as the two sons of Robert Trent Jones, the dominant architect of the postwar modernist Age, Rees and Robert Trent Jones II). Further, many of the classic courses are owned by exclusive clubs accused of racism, sexism, or anti-Semitism.

Golf architecture's acceptance has been held back by a lack of persuasive historical accounts that could make sense of its profusion of styles. And the mutability of courses constantly trips up the acolyte. For example, Augusta National has been revised by 14 different architects, none as talented as MacKenzie, the original designer. Only in the last decade have aficionados begun to pull together comprehensive histories of the evolution of individual courses.

Besides, the unpredictable interplay between the architect and the peculiarities of the land can mock theories of stylistic evolution. For example, Trent Jones's savage New Course at Ballybunion, Ireland, with its tiny greens clinging to shaggy 100-foot-tall sand dunes, looks nothing like his standard American course, such as mellow Firestone South in the gentle parkland outside Akron. Throughout the history of golf architecture, the genius of a special piece of land has shaped the architect as much as any genius of an architect has shaped the land.

Building courses can be extraordinarily expensive. Back in 1989, Fazio and casino owner Steve Wynn spent about \$40 million on Shadow Creek. In the barren desert outside of Las Vegas, Fazio dug a half-square-mile hole 60 feet deep. He then converted its interior into an apotheosis of the North Carolina Sand Hills by building giant undulations, installing creeks and lakes, and planting 21,000 pine trees. Golf is undergoing a recession, so the price of a four-hour round at Shadow Creek was recently lowered from \$1,000 to \$500.

On the other hand the Old Course at St. Andrews, the "home of golf" in Scotland, cost almost nothing since it mostly wasn't designed. Instead, it evolved during golf architecture's Folk Age out of the sheep-shorn, grass-covered sand dunes, or "linksland," through which sailors would stroll from the town to the shore, striking stones with sticks as they went. Over the centuries, favorite corridors, or fairways, emerged. In the low spots where rocks, and later balls, were most likely to wind up, repeated swings tore through the grass and exposed the underlying sand, which is why the placement of the bunkers at St. Andrews is so frustrating that the links remain enough of a test to host this July's British Open.

In the Craftsman Age of golf course design—beginning in the revolutionary year of 1848 with the building of the famous 17th green at St. Andrews—golf pros like Allan Robertson and Old Tom Morris would construct greens or bunkers only after trying to find natural golf holes already latent amidst the dunes.

Despite their seaside locations, many Scottish courses weren't instantly scenically appealing, often being more of a taste acquired as one's understanding of golf strategy matured. The thrifty Scots made golf courses out of sandy, crumpled land of little value for farming. When the American hillbilly champion Sam Snead first sighted the Old Course in 1946, he supposedly scoffed, "Down home, we plant cow beets on land like that."

In 1901, Willie Park Jr. unshackled golf from the linksland by forging the first excellent inland courses, Huntercombe and Sunningdale, outside of London. This opened the Golden Age of golf architecture (1901-1932).

AT THE **FIRST GREAT AMERICAN GOLF COURSE**, CHARLES BLAIR MACDONALD'S **NATIONAL GOLF LINKS OF AMERICA IN THE HAMPTONS**, ROBBER-BARON INDUSTRIALISTS WOULD **DOCK THEIR STEAM YACHTS** NEXT TO HIS MIND-BENDINGLY INTRICATE COURSE.

The vast concentrations of wealth that existed before income and estate taxes could do their leveling work made possible daring, idiosyncratic designs. At the first great American golf course, Charles Blair MacDonald's National Golf Links of America in the Hamptons, robber-baron industrialists would dock their steam yachts next to his mind-bendingly intricate course, featuring holes modeled on the best of St. Andrews and other British links.

These decades combined flamboyant creativity with an appreciation of the sturdy principles behind the old Scottish courses, including a taste for quirkiness, irregularity, fidelity to place, and random rubs of the green. This innovative age coincided with the similarly fertile period in American architecture that stretched from Louis Sullivan through Frank Lloyd Wright and the Arts and Crafts Movement to the Art Deco of the Chrysler Building. It was a period of legendary golf architects such as Tillinghast, William Flynn, and Donald Ross. There were also gifted amateurs such as Philadelphia hotel-owner George Crump, who lived for years in a wilderness cabin as his crews carved from the forest his stupendous Pine Valley, now usually rated the best course in the world.

A recurrent pattern in art history is that a style becomes progressively more complicated over time until a new, simpler manner sweeps the old clutter away, such as the pompous 1970s progressive rock of Yes and Emerson, Lake

& Palmer getting undermined by the three-chord punk rock of the Ramones and the Sex Pistols, or over-decorated Victorian furniture giving way to Mies van der Rohe's unadorned steel and leather Barcelona chair.

The transitional golf course between the originality of the Golden Age and the rationality of the Modern Age was Augusta National, which opened in 1932. As the perpetual home of the Masters Tournament, the only major cham-

pionship played on the same course each year, Augusta became the most influential course of the middle of the 20th century. Originally a showcase for MacKenzie's fertile Golden Age imagination, with boomerang-shaped greens and vast, sprawling bunkers, after the master's death in 1934, Augusta was slowly streamlined into the archetypal modernist course with roundish greens and sand traps, threatening water hazards, and perfect greenskeeping. The most notable remodeler was Trent Jones, who redesigned the 11th and 16th holes with his trademark lakes coming right up to the edge of the greens. Today, only one of MacKenzie's bunkers is left, the spectacular but curiously placed 70-yard-long sand trap on the 10th hole.

Following the long hiatus in course building caused by the Depression and World War II, Trent Jones rationalized and internationalized course design during the Modern Age (1948-1980). His approach was curiously similar to that of the Bauhaus architects, such as van der Rohe, who believed the phrase "form follows function" offered the only moral philosophy of design.

Prosperity was broad, but with income-tax rates as high as 93 percent, wealth was too widely dispersed and bureaucratically managed to permit many rich men's follies like Pine Valley. Trent Jones's golf courses were big, sleek, straightforward, and efficient, just like Skidmore, Owings, and Merrill's Lever House and the other flat-roofed steel and glass skyscrapers that sprouted across America during the age of the Organization Man.

Unfortunately, like the modernist office buildings, Jones's courses got a little ... boring. Much of the appeal of golf courses is that they epitomize a particular landscape, offering focus and continuity of form to guide the eye and help you notice the local differences. Yet

**New information, acquired from a computer of a senior associate of Jordanian terrorist Abu Mu'sab al-Zarqawi in Iraq,**

has alarmed counterterrorist officials in the United States. Some of the data, which was reconstructed after being erased from the hard drive, suggests a much greater capability of Zarqawi to sponsor a terrorist event in the U.S. Previously, intercepted information had indicated Zarqawi was too preoccupied with Iraq operations to carry out attacks against the continental United States, but the FBI now believes that Zarqawi was deliberately leaking disinformation to create that impression. Zarqawi's organization "al-Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers" has a deep-cover operative—called "the American" in the reconstruction—whose identity has been compartmented from the rest of al-Qaeda. It is not clear where "the American" is located, but he does not appear to be in Iraq. The reconstruction suggests that this operative might be responsible for carrying out an attack on one of three possible targets—Florida, Ohio, or Texas, all identified in the reconstructed text as "Red States," demonstrating *inter alia* that al-Qaeda has followed U.S. elections and politics.



**The Spanish investigation of the March 2004 Madrid train bombings led to the discovery of sketches thought vaguely to resemble Grand Central Station in New York.**

The information was shared with the U.S. government in December, but there was no indication of any real plan and the drawings were not considered sufficient to carry out an operation. Some FBI analysts doubt that the not-to-scale sketches represent Grand Central or any other place in New York City. But because both Grand Central and Penn Stations in New York have previously been mentioned by al-Qaeda as a possible targets, the FBI is treating the information seriously.



**January media reports suggesting that al-Qaeda was attempting to recruit "jihadi warriors" in Iraq**

to carry out a terrorist operation in the U.S. were apparently based on deliberate leaks from a senior Pentagon official. The motive may have been to demonstrate that Iraq is now the center of international terrorism. The leak was conveniently made one day before Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz testified before Congress. The press report, based on an intercepted satellite phone conversation, predictably led to a shutdown of the phone and the loss of the source of information.



**The United States Committee for a Free Lebanon, a major player in shaping Bush administration policy**

towards Beirut and Damascus, has chosen to ignore what the probable consequences of a truly democratic electoral process would be. Hezbollah enjoys broad support in the near-majority Shi'ite community and one-man one-vote would likely return it as the largest political party in Lebanon. The committee, which has its offices on Park Avenue in New York, has a "Golden Circle" of key supporters. The "Circle" includes Elliot Abrams, Paula Dobriansky, Douglas Feith, Frank Gaffney, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Michael Ledeen, Richard Perle, Daniel Pipes, and David Wurmser.

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*Philip Giraldi, a former CIA Officer, is a partner in Cannistraro Associates, an international security consultancy.*



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
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
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by building the same style everywhere, the modern look made courses repetitious. Jones would put one set of bunkers alongside the fairway about 250 yards off the tee to capture wayward drives and another set around the green to menace approach shots. A perfectly logical formula, but formula is the enemy of charm. In contrast, Golden Age architects distributed their traps more unpredictably to pester different classes of golfers.

A more subtle problem was that the hallmarks of modernist art—abstraction and reductionism—may not work well in golf course architecture. While eliminating the unnecessary is often a stroke of genius in sculpture, complexity is currently seen as a virtue in golf courses. The amount of value an architect adds to a site is frequently a simple equation of talent multiplied by time spent studying the land. MacDonald fiddled with the National for decades, and Donald Ross spent the Depression refining Pinehurst #2, where the U.S. Open will be held this June.

Somewhat like Robert Venturi in architecture, Dye ushered in the Post-modern Age (1981-?) with a series of striking courses culminating in his Tournament Players Club. In contrast to Trent Jones's balanced and sweeping corporate look, Dye revived the abrupt vertical discontinuities, contrasts, and oddities of the old Scottish links. He would prop a flat green over a flat sand trap by means of a six-foot-high wall of railroad ties, leading Bob Hope to note that Dye built the only courses in danger of burning down.

Facilitated by advances in earthmoving machines and fueled by easy savings-and-loan financing, the Scottish revival courses of Dye, Fazio, and Nicklaus ironically emerged as some of the most staggeringly opulent relics of the '80s. Budgets became even more extravagant in the '90s. Yet just as

American culture in general has become slightly more traditionalist over the last ten years, the last decade saw enthusiastic efforts to restore great pre-Depression golf courses to their eccentric glories.

Prosperity and technology have made anything possible in design, whether Frank Gehry's titanium UFO-crash of a Guggenheim Museum in Bilbao, Spain, or Dye's 1999 Whistling Straits golf course, where faucet king Herb Kohler gave him an unlimited budget. Dye famously exceeded it reproducing on a flat Wisconsin shoreline the 50-foot-tall sand dunes of the wild Irish links. While Whistling Straits and its 500 or so sand traps was much admired at last year's PGA Championship, critics might be overreacting against the stripped-down modern style by judging any degree of elaboration an asset. If tastes shift back toward simplicity, the next generation might label Whistling Straits a labyrinthine monstrosity.

Today the great controversy is between the established Fazio, the maestro of aesthetics who recently revamped Augusta, and challengers like the sharp-tongued Doak, the expert on angles who crafted on the remote Oregon coast the gnarled and byzantine Pacific Dunes links in the Scottish tradition. Fazio frames his holes so that first-time players can instantly see the proper line, while Doak's baffling holes defy golfers to figure out which direction will work best.

Golf architecture is a young art, and just as Tiger Woods showed that the best was yet to come among players, it's forgivable to hope that we will someday see a design prodigy who can fully merge beauty and guile. ■

*Steve Sailer is TAC's film critic and a columnist for VDARE.com. His blog is at [www.isteve.com](http://www.isteve.com).*

# Spokesman for the Silent Majority

In an epoch of minority grievance, Sam Francis stood up for the least fashionable ethnic group.

**By Scott McConnell**

FOR THE SMALL CITY, it must have seemed an odd event, this gathering of some six or eight dozen people from all corners of the country to bury a native son that Chattanooga barely knew it had. Among those who pay close attention to ideological politics, especially on the Right, Sam Francis was nationally known. But that is a small number. A question I heard several times, from guests who were friends of Sam's sister but didn't know Sam, was "What did he stand for?" The follow-up, more implied than stated, was "What made him important enough for so many people to come down here for his funeral and yet so obscure that I never heard of him?"

When asked this by a local businessman, I answered correctly, if not very provocatively, that Sam was a kind of theoretician for a group he labeled "Middle American Radicals"—by which he meant average Americans who were getting pummeled and hurt by the forces of globalization and the kind of anti-white culture war being waged in this country since the 1970s. (I probably left out the anti-white part.) My interlocutor nodded, but I'm not sure how much he comprehended.

Jared Taylor, publisher of the racialist monthly *American Renaissance*, later told me he had answered the same question (posed by a cab driver on the way from the airport) by saying, "Well, he stood up for white people." Yes, that is also true, though if that were the main thing that Sam Francis had done, he would not have been an interesting

writer to as wide a circle as he was. Taylor told me his cab driver cogitated on his answer for a long time, uncertain how to respond. Finally the driver, who was white, said, "Well I guess that's okay, there's the NAACP and all."

It is one of the anomalies of American life—pointed out not infrequently by people like Jared Taylor—that while it is normal and expected for almost every ethnic and racial group to have its advocates, that is not the case for whites. There are reasons beyond simple wariness of political correctness. The culture of American whites comes from disparate ethnic and religious pasts—the bonds of a common "whiteness" are thin indeed. Any real white-advocacy movement that tended—as seems inevitable—toward white separatism would be freighted down by sentiments of selfishness and guilt, and no worthwhile politi-

cally. Igniting it would be despair and powerlessness, a quantum leap in the discrimination whites face now through affirmative action, a flare-up in a sense of cultural dispossession that now only smolders. The continuance of mass immigration, reducing whites to minority status in the United States, will produce a heightened consciousness of whiteness, however artificial. A foreshadowing might be what takes place now in many prisons, where whites—a minority group like every other—form racial gangs for self-protection. It is hardly a glorious future.

While Sam Francis was not a white nationalist, in the last few years of his life, "sticking up for white people"—documenting the ways in which whites were gradually being pushed and marginalized by the juggernaut of multiculturalism—became his principal subject,

**GENUINE WHITE NATIONALISM WOULD ENTAIL GIVING UP ON A PRESENT**

**AMERICAN CULTURE, BOTH RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR, TOWARD WHICH THE VAST MAJORITY OF WHITE AMERICANS FEEL A STRONG ALLEGIANCE.**

cal endeavor can be accomplished without its adherents believing their goals to be noble. And genuine white nationalism would entail giving up on a present American culture, both religious and secular, toward which the vast majority of white Americans feel a strong allegiance.

Such arguments don't mean some form of white nationalism won't have its

the one he was paid and expected to write about. This was not necessarily his own choice but one forced upon him by the tide of conservative-movement political correctness: in the mid-1990s Sam wrote one or two columns and said one or two things that crossed the line, and various writers—often those eager to deflect charges of racism from them—

selves by charging someone else with racism—moved in for the kill. He lost his job at the *Washington Times*, where he had been an award-winning editorial writer and columnist, and thereafter subsisted by editing and writing for relatively obscure publications. His syndicated columns, dropped by most papers, became predictable. He was kept too busy churning out stuff that was unread by most smart people to devote much time to the complicated and nuanced work for which he was manifestly made.

It is an injustice that Sam was brought down like this, when one can point to any number of people who are not close to being his intellectual equals yet have comfortable sinecures in ethnic-studies departments. But that is a reality of cultural power in the United States, and Sam—a realist—understood the realities of power.

I first read Sam Francis sometime in the early 1990s. I was discussing the first Perot and Buchanan campaigns with my friend Fred Siegel, a New York social democrat then in the midst of his own transition toward neoconservatism. Siegel told me if I wanted a deeper

understanding of these campaigns—whose importance we both sensed—I ought to read a piece by Sam in *Chronicles* (this said amidst much hemming and hawing that he was not endorsing the reading of *Chronicles* or anything about it). He gave me the address of a tiny bookstore in the West Village, the only place in New York City, apparently, where this subversive publication could be purchased.

In the piece, Francis analyzed Middle American radicalism and explored more thoroughly than anyone else what the social movements unleashed by the Perot and Buchanan campaigns might achieve. The piece I never succeeded in getting him to write for *TAC* was why these movements so fell short of what he hoped for them.


In the course of the decade, I came to know Sam, meeting him for the first time at an immigration conference. We talked of our mutual friend Eric Breindel with whom, Sam told me, he used to eat lunch just about every day when the two were Senate aides.

Six years ago this month I was in London, at a conference sponsored by *Chronicles* devoted to the Balkan crisis. In the morning, prior to gathering in one of the old lecture halls at the University of London where he would be one of the speakers, I spied Sam walking about under the trees, looking at the centuries-old buildings, quiet, pensive, sad. “What’s up, Sam?” I asked. He replied, “I was just wondering what happened to my career.” There was not much I could say. It was in many ways an impressive career: five books on widely varied subjects, an important monthly column in *Chronicles*. And yet, it so clearly could have been much more.

The funeral was far from an unhappy occasion. At the dinner the night before, speakers relayed anecdotes from the 1980s, recounting the parties held by movement conservatives, where, after

most of the guests had gone home, a dozen would gather late into the night around Sam and listen to his wry, mordant comments on the week’s events and the pretenses of official Washington. Other memories came forth: how a precocious Sam had been able to help his sister with her homework even though he was eight years her junior; that he had been a pre-med at Johns Hopkins, planning to become a psychiatrist before getting diverted to political theory; that his middle name, Todd, derived from his relation to Mary Todd, Abraham Lincoln’s wife.

At noon, on a sunny Saturday morning at the foot of Chattanooga’s Lookout Mountain, a Presbyterian minister gave a eulogy for Sam. I wondered what a man might say who hardly knew Sam or his work. He spoke of our Lord and the difficult truth He bore with Him and how it was rejected in His own time. And then, astonishingly, the minister turned to Sam and spoke of how he too had taken upon himself the burden of telling the truth and how some had turned away from him because of it. After the service, Sam’s friend Sylvia Crutchfield told me that several days before the funeral the minister had asked to read some of Sam’s writings, and this was what he came up with. It was remarkable to realize the impact Sam Francis’s writing could have on someone reading him for the first time. The tribute offered at the base of the mountain was one that could not be given honestly to the overwhelming majority of Washington opinion journalists, almost all of whom make livings far more comfortable, far more successful, than he did. Far better, of course, if Sam could have been so honored during his lifetime—but if this was a sign of how Sam Francis might be read by future generations, it is a result he would happily accept. ■



# Arts & Letters

## PMS 293 & K

### BOOKS

[*The Lives and Times of the Great Composers*, Michael Steen, Oxford University Press, 992 pages]

## Background Noise

By R.J. Stove

"There are no good books about music."

—Sir Thomas "Tommy" Beecham  
(1879-1961)

TOMMYROT, OF COURSE, and no doubt a deliberate tease, like most of the celebrated conductor's other aphorisms. Yet good one-volume reference works specifically on composers remain scarce. Recent decades' least unsatisfying books of this type are *Lives Of The Great Composers* (by the late *New York Times* critic Harold C. Schonberg) and *The Illustrated Encyclopedia Of Classical Music* (by the late *Gramophone* critic Lionel Salter). Neither earns consistent acclaim.

Schonberg at his best wrote with delightful flair, but his coverage of pre-1700 and post-1945 music runs the gamut from inadequacy to uselessness. Furthermore, his obvious aversion to so many of his subjects (notably Sibelius, César Franck, Richard Strauss, and Strauss's younger rival Max Reger) makes several chapters seem less like considered judgments than like strident prosecutorial harangues. Salter's work, the much more visually appealing of the two—it foreshadows a Dorling Kinders-

ley polychrome extravaganza—suffers from its biographies' extreme concision (most composers receive less than a page) and from LP-only discographies untenable in the CD epoch. Sometimes, because of both books' flaws, the temptation is to recommend instead such spectacularly geriatric publications as *Men of Music*, a 1939 conspectus with whose heavily foxed leaves several hundred thousand Anglophones must have grown up.

Given *Men of Music's* antediluvian Whiggism, Schonberg's cavalier verdicts, and Salter's invocations of long-deleted vinyl, the field has lain wide open for a guide simultaneously diligent and fluent—virtues that Michael Steen's writing certainly possesses. Steen, a Dublin-born organist, chairman of London's Royal College of Music Society. Incredibly, this seems to be his first book; such panache and exuberance as he demonstrates at the word processor seldom occur without years of authorial drudging beforehand. For all his prose's translucence, he is clearly unashamed of being an intelligent adult writing for other intelligent adults. Why, he even dares to include the occasional sentence in untranslated French! "What kills art," Kenneth Tynan noted sadly 44 years ago, "is the assumption that people are stupid."

Two grave faults afflict Steen's production, however. The first is that the earliest composers discussed at length are Bach and Handel. In other words, no chapters devoted to Palestrina, Monteverdi, Purcell, Telemann, or Vivaldi, let alone William Byrd, Heinrich Schütz, Jean-Baptiste Lully, François Couperin, Arcangelo Corelli, or Tomás Luis de Victoria. Neglecting such early greats outright—or, as here, dispatching most of them in a few lines while ignoring the

others—was frequent practice in generalist historiography until the 1960s. It had little justification even then (since sheet music of such composers had already become available even when recordings had not) and has far less today.

Steen's stated reasons for skimping on the Renaissance and Baroque heritage mostly concern its absence of tonality in the modern sense, and they sound specious: "much of the pleasure in listening to music is actually provided by the tension as the music moves away from the initially established key and reverts back to it." (Why, then, did CDs of plainchant, music notated centuries before major-minor key systems developed, become bestsellers during the 1990s?) Sometimes the rationale proffered is pure absence of biographical melodrama: "we know little about Purcell." (Is Purcell's output somehow diminished as a result?) At other times a regrettable consequentialism prevails: Lully fails to score inclusion because "Lully's monopoly [over French opera] constrained the progress of music in France." Oh dear, the Progress Shtick rears its dopey, discredited, and malodorous head again. Perhaps a commissioning editor forced upon Steen these glib dismissals of Baroque composers. Commissioning editors tend to be good these days at similar dumbings-down.

The second fault is wider ranging: an all too evident preoccupation with the historical background at the expense of the musical foreground. Putting composers into their larger social context has many merits. Not the least of these merits is the heartburn the strategy will induce in Leo Strauss's apologists, who fulminate against all such erudition as constituting the dreaded vice of "historicism," by which they appear to mean



simple historical literacy. Yet when the context wholly overpowers the composers, you have problems. Imagine a director's cut of "Gladiator" in which each extra in each crowd scene has been successively captured through unremitting close-ups of his every wart, wen, pimple, and nose-hair. Meanwhile Russell Crowe is left largely unnoticed on the sidelines. Such relentless foregrounding of what belongs in the distance would induce among moviegoers the same white-knuckled vertigo that Steen's commentary causes in section after section.

With Steen's method, the most politically conscious composers—Handel in the 18th century; Beethoven, Liszt, Verdi, and Wagner in the 19th; Bartók, Janáček, and Shostakovich in the 20th—tend to fare better than quietist introverts. All too often, though, the tale is simply overwhelmed by military, economic, and administrative irrelevancies. Consider one figure whom Steen's prelude slights, namely the aforementioned

the scaffold with one of her children sucking at her breast." There is not the slightest indication that Handel had even heard of Mrs. Jones, but Steen hauls her onto the stage anyhow for cheap thrills rather than through any other discernible motive.

Similarly, no sooner has Tchaikovsky started a brief tour of America than Steen inundates readers with references to Sitting Bull, Crazy Horse, Hopalong Cassidy, Mark Twain, Walt Whitman, the Vanderbilt and Guggenheim fortunes, the hymn writers Moody and Sankey, and the Grant administration's misdeeds. Of those topics the Russian musical genius probably went to his grave in complete ignorance. They certainly left no impact whatever on his muse. Why, therefore, incorporate more than a fraction of them? All these frenetic allusions occur, be it noted, on just one page.

Such impediments to actual knowledge might be more tolerable if Steen better conveyed the difference between the artistically crucial and the artisti-

scholastic milestones—who in recent years has fooled thousands of tone-deaf tabloid-addicts into thinking him musically literate. (Indeed, Lebrecht may be said to have invented a whole new discipline: pornomusicology.) Lebrechtianism infests Steen's accounts of nonmusicians like Emperor Joseph II, who, we are solemnly informed, "explained to [his genitally malformed brother-in-law] Louis XVI that procreation requires movement as well as insertion." (Do tell.) The outcome in Steen's accounts of musicians is still more unfortunate. Take Steen's thoroughly Lebrechtian analysis of Francis Poulenc, who died in 1963. Posterity, in its misguided way, has remembered Poulenc for his motets, his songs, his opera *The Dialogues of the Carmelites*, his *Concert Champêtre* for harpsichord and orchestra, and half a dozen other pieces. Thanks to Steen's sleuthing, we can now appreciate Poulenc's real distinction: homoerotic carnality with "a painter, a chauffeur, a traveling salesman, a junior executive at Citroën, [and] a colonial infantryman ... apart from nocturnal adventures in the Paris *pissoirs*, picking up 'peasants' from the countryside and a young clergyman in Boston." After this roll call, the sarcastic words of Chicago columnist Mike Royko, describing some debauched baseball star, warrant misquotation: "you have to wonder how good Poulenc would have been if he hadn't wasted so much time composing."

The annoying thing is that when Steen makes the effort to prune his research's foliage and retrieve his brain from the gutter, we can rejoice. Brahms, despite the tedious Germanic domesticity of his outward life—Kant's existence was, by comparison with Brahms's, almost soap-operatic—has elicited from Steen a small gem of unpretentious narrative, with a suitable touch of elegy about it. (If Brahms had written the Beach Boys' hits, even they would have come out sounding autumnal.) The chapter on Schumann is so well done as to be, in dealing with that master's final descent into stuporose madness, almost unbear-

# **RELENTLESS FOREGROUNDING OF WHAT BELONGS IN THE DISTANCE WOULD INDUCE AMONG MOVIEGOERS THE SAME WHITE-KNUCKLED VERTIGO THAT STEEN'S COMMENTARY CAUSES IN SECTION AFTER SECTION.**

Schütz: might not a sentence or two on Schütz's life and biggest compositions have made more sense than Steen's actual information—however impressive in itself—that Schütz's beer-swilling employer "would pour the dregs of his tankard over a servant's head as a signal for more"?

Among later, more renowned musicians the situation grows worse. The importance to Handel of the Hanoverian monarchy and of subsequent Jacobite rebellions (he dedicated his oratorio *Judas Maccabeus* to the Jacobites' nemesis, "Billy the Butcher" Cumberland) is well attested, and Steen is correct in citing these events. Not so the fate of Mary Jones, a shoplifting servant-girl who enjoyed the possibly unique distinction of being "hauled to

cally trivial in the composers' own lives. Alas, there is something decidedly adolescent about Steen's reluctance to keep his mind above his navel. Yes, Schubert, Donizetti, Smetana, and Hugo Wolf did all contract syphilis, a fact bowdlerized into incomprehensibility by most of their pre-World War II biographers. Yes, Scriabin did seduce a 15-year-old girl. And yes, we know that no young male in Tchaikovsky's orbit could rely on being a safe young male. There is, nevertheless, a crucial distinction between discussing depravity and rubbing readers' faces in it.

It is tempting to detect in Steen's prurience the soiled paw prints of fashionable British gossip-columnist Norman Lebrecht—perpetrator of *Why Conductors Have Great Sex* and similar



ably poignant. Steen on Sibelius supplies useful data rarely found otherwise. Here, writing these words, is one music buff who considers himself all the richer for having learnt from Steen that on his 90th birthday Sibelius had received “cigars from Churchill and 12,000 telegrams.”

Franck, so apt to irk critics of nationalist kidney (numerous Teutons find his style too Gallic, numerous Gauls too Teutonic) is also intelligently introduced here. Steen reveals the sad news that the Franck statue which for decades stood outside Paris's Sainte-Clotilde church, where Franck long served as organist, was recently toppled by a falling tree—and that the city council has no plans to restore it. What a relief it is, besides, to see Wagner and his ideologies discussed with calm sapience for a change. Junk-media denunciations of Wagner have grown so formulaically repetitive that they could easily be used as voicemail. (“You have reached *The Daily Sleaze*'s Arts Editor. Press 1 to hear how Wagner was responsible for Auschwitz. Press 2 to hear how Wagner was responsible for Auschwitz. Press 3 to hear how Wagner was responsible for ...”) To such balderdash Steen supplies an agreeable corrective.

Maybe this sometimes brilliant but more often frustrating behemoth would have been more fittingly conceived as two books rather than one. Steen, obviously a man of immense expository talent, had it in him to provide a fascinating general history of modern European politics, one quite separate from a fascinating general history of European music. As it is, two different literary projects are here bound together like Siamese twins, and both suffer for it. No need, then, to remove Schonberg's and Salter's surveys from library shelves quite yet. Still, perhaps in 2005 the best possible entrée to composers' biographies is the one that you can compile yourself after hours or days of sustained Internet-surfing. ■

*R.J. Stove lives in Melbourne, Australia.*

[*Blog: Understanding the Information Reformation That's Changing Your World*, Hugh Hewitt, Nelson Books, 225 pages]

## The World at Their Fingertips

By Clark Stooksbury

2004 WAS THE YEAR of the blog. Politicians and big-media mandarins alike were humbled by private citizens blogging from their homes while wearing pajamas. CBS News and Dan Rather became high-profile victims when they posted faked documents on the Web relating to a story on the president's National Guard service. Several blogs began noting that with features like a superscripted “th,” the papers appeared to have been produced by a modern word-processing program instead of a 30-year-old typewriter.

Hugh Hewitt is a leading evangelist of the blogosphere, and it is not surprising that he is the first to transform the story of blogs into book form. Hewitt—a law professor, talk-radio host, and fierce Republican partisan—focuses his attention on the center-right portion of the blogosphere that supports the Iraq War and the Bush administration. His partisanship is both a strength and weakness: it keeps him on message, always in tune with the agenda of the Republican Party. But it also impairs his vision; he dismisses liberal and Democrat-oriented blogs almost out of hand. And forget about websites that are non-Left but also antiwar and/or critical of President Bush—LewRockwell.com, Antiwar.com, etc. Hewitt doesn't mention them at all.

*Blog* usefully compares the rise of the blogosphere and its war against big media with the role of the printing press in spawning the Protestant Reformation. Hewitt relates the tale that after Luther posted his 95 Theses in Latin, “someone, no one knows exactly who,

got hold of a copy of Luther's theses, translated the Latin into German, and published them. Thanks to Gutenberg, Luther—and more important, his ideas—were known all over Germany within two weeks, and all over Europe in a month.” Hewitt seems actually to believe that blogs will kill off the old media: “you have to be very dim indeed to be planning a career as a print journalist these days,” he says, as if newspapers, magazines, and other non-blog forms of communication will cease to exist. This is odd, since he went to the trouble recently to suggest several names to replace William Safire at the *New York Times*. Why bother if the medium is on its deathbed? Hewitt should take note that the Catholic Church survived the Protestant Reformation and exists to this day.

He and his allies would also be wise to think about how their own world might collapse. The blogosphere will continue to be a source of political and cultural commentary, and it will evolve in ways that I won't try to predict. But Hewitt's portion, the right-wing new-media echo chamber, may be riding for a fall. When like-minded people only communicate with each other, they are vulnerable to groupthink and are setting themselves up for unpleasant surprises.

Former *New Yorker* film critic Pauline Kael famously wondered how Richard Nixon could have won in 1972 when nobody she knew had voted for him. *Blog* shows signs of this sort of insular thinking. Hewitt makes numerous assertions without feeling the need to back them up with sources. Without much evidence, he accuses *New York Times* columnist Paul Krugman of lifting a quote from liberal blogger Joshua Micah Marshall. I am aware that there is a mini-industry on the Web dedicated to correcting alleged Krugman errors. But I don't assume that Krugman is wrong just because a right-wing blogger has attacked him—or just because he's Paul Krugman.

Similarly, when Hewitt notes that CBS lost ratings after the Raftergate scandal, he doesn't bother to give any

numbers. It is possible that the author is trying to avoid a CBS problem himself. The network got in trouble not by running the National Guard story but by posting the bogus documents on the Web, where anybody could evaluate them. By not giving sources, Hewitt makes it harder for readers to verify his claims. But perhaps he is just confident that his intended audience will accept his assertions without question; sources would be superfluous.

Bloggers on the right side of the Web have done a lot of work to hold what they contemptuously refer to as the "MSM" (mainstream media) accountable. They do less well when their allies transgress, as I know from firsthand experience. In late May 2004, Jonah Goldberg and Glenn "Instapundit" Reynolds approvingly linked to a *Boston Herald* editorial that dishonestly truncated a quote from former Vice President Gore in order to use his words against him. The *Herald* quoted Gore as saying that Americans have an "innate vulnerability to temptation... to use power to abuse others." He actually said, "Our founders were insightful stu-

dents of human nature. They feared the abuse of power because they understood that every human being has not only 'better angels' in his nature, but also an innate vulnerability to temptation—especially the temptation to abuse power over others." I naïvely thought the big-time bloggers would note and denounce the *Boston Herald's* mendacity when I pointed it out to them.

They neglected to do so, even after it was noted on *Reason's* "Hit & Run" blog. This stands in stark contrast to the center-right blogosphere's outrage over

Child Left Behind Act occurred after *Blog* was published, but it is interesting to note the center-right blogosphere's response. With few exceptions, it was not overly concerned about the affair. They did not create a large-scale "opinion storm," as Hewitt would call it. Most of the commentary questioned Williams and his ethics without calling for accountability from the Bush administration.

Hewitt sees the blind spots of other bloggers. Referring to Josh Marshall's lack of interest in the Howell

## FOR HEWITT TO PAINT ANOTHER BLOGGER AS "HYPER-PARTISAN" IS LIKE THE POST OFFICE CALLING A DIAL-UP CONNECTION SLOW.

Maureen Dowd's similar mangling of the words of President Bush, to which Hewitt briefly alludes when discussing the role of blogs in ending Howell Raines's tenure at the *New York Times*.

Hewitt's side of the blogosphere is tethered to the Bush administration and particularly to the war in Iraq. Notably absent from the list of big shots skewered in *Blog* are Don Rumsfeld, Ahmad Chalabi, and Richard Perle. I haven't seen where Hewitt or his allies have demanded accountability for the Abu Ghraib scandal (above the level of Specialist Graner) or for the fact that the cakewalk brigade in charge at the Pentagon was totally unprepared for what happened after the rose-petal throwing ended. They were too busy running interference for Rumsfeld and company to raise troubling questions. Andrew Sullivan, who has repeatedly and vociferously denounced the Abu Ghraib scandal, is an exception. But Hewitt reads him out of the club when noting his role in the takedown of Trent Lott, referring to him as the "then-conservative blogger Andrew Sullivan."

And then there is the curious incident of the lapdogs that did not bark. *USA Today's* exposure of Armstrong Williams's acceptance of almost a quarter of a million dollars from the Department of Education to shill for the No

Raines/Jayson Blair story at the *New York Times*, Hewitt writes, "the center-right bloggers had been part of the effort to oust Lott, but the hyper-partisan Marshall provided an early example that the blogosphere, like MSM, had its corners where partisan advantage would trump story line." For Hewitt, who has about as much critical distance from the Bush administration as Karl Rove, to paint another blogger as "hyper-partisan" is like the post office calling a dial-up connection slow. Even the campaign against Lott was a White House approved take-down of a potential political liability who was not beloved by conservative Republicans. It is hard to imagine a circumstance where Hewitt's crowd would attempt to hold anyone in the Bush administration accountable for anything other than deviance from the party line. I searched Hewitt's site and found one reference to Abu Ghraib in the last year, compared to at least nine references to John Kerry's fanciful stories about spending Christmas Eve in Cambodia in 1968.

Hewitt's slender volume is in a sense two books. The part to which I have devoted most of this review is a brief, polemical overview of the right-wing blogosphere. The other is a boosterish business/leadership tome devoted to the rising importance of blogging. In the

## MOVING?

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introduction Hewitt advises—no, demands—that the purchaser “read this book very quickly and distribute it to your senior leadership, then hold a few days retreat to discuss what is going on. I have made it short [thanks, Hugh] so that you can absorb it on a plane ride... When you go on the retreat, spend the extra bucks to bring along one or two or even three of the bloggers from the very large A team... I am thinking of my audience as senior and mid-level executives in business, government, the arts, the church, and especially in politics, if television affects your life, the blogosphere will as well.”

Although I doubt that executives across the country are convening corporate retreats and shelling out big bucks for lectures from bloggers, Hewitt has a point. Blogs are a new and radically decentralized means of dispensing information and opinion. People and businesses in the public eye should be aware of the danger of being caught up in a blog-generated opinion storm. Hewitt also believes that companies and business leaders should start their own blogs. On this I can agree with him: I think that blogs are such a good idea that I started one myself, [clarkstooksbury.blogspot.com](http://clarkstooksbury.blogspot.com). It includes links related to some of my claims in this review.

It is great that the power of big media is eroding, a process that was underway long before the rise of the blogosphere. As early as 1993, Michael Crichton predicted that the *New York Times* would be gone in ten years. He now says he was a bit premature. Hewitt, standing deathwatch over such institutions as the *Times*, should be careful: there was no blogosphere to speak of in 2000; it was a huge story by 2004. Dan Rather succumbed to the arrogance of power and never saw his downfall coming. There is no reason to assume that the same fate can't befall a few big-name bloggers by 2008. ■

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[*John Jay: Founding Father, Walter Stahr, Hambledon & London, 482 pages*]

## America's Prime Minister

By Kevin C. Gutzman

JOHN JAY SURELY IS the least appreciated great man of the American revolutionary era. His fame has waned even as that of arguably less significant contemporaries has waxed. If, as Forrest McDonald argued in *The Presidency of Thomas Jefferson* (echoing the Peripatetic), the most important test of a man is what he does, then John Jay merits a rank right behind George Washington among the pre-eminent Americans of his generation and indeed among the most notable of any generation.

Jay was a propagandist, lawgiver, spymaster, diplomat, political philosopher, philanthropist, abolitionist, jurist, and legislator. He was also, by all accounts, an exemplary father and doting husband. His achievements were, to borrow an 18th-century term, signal in each of his fields, in some cases unbelievably so. Alexander Hamilton and John Adams, two of the leading “Founders Chic” commodities, never approached Jay's accomplishments, and yet they are far more renowned than he. Thus it is high time for a new Jay biography.

He was born into a prominent New York merchant family and married into the colony's nobility. Jay's father, the son of a Huguenot refugee, saw to it that his oldest son was put up in a francophone New Rochelle boarding school, received a King's College education, and was provided with first-class training as a lawyer by one of the New York bar's leading lights. John's marriage into the Livingston family, New York's leading political clan, gave him a network of indispensable political and social connections that facilitated his career as patriot politician. While not an unmixed

blessing—his feud with brother-in-law Brockholst Livingston, for example, receives some slight attention here—Jay's marriage was as good a bargain as he might have hoped.

By the time the Revolution began, Jay was an attorney in his early 30s with what Richard Nixon once called “an iron butt,” the ability to apply his sharp mind to detailed work for long hours. As a member of his Provincial Congress in 1777, Jay became the chief author of the New York constitution of that year. After independence, he served as governor of the state; by the time he finished his second term in 1801, he had seen to the reform of the state's penal code, pushed the first American experiment with penitentiaries (the traditional British penalty for virtually all crimes, from treason and murder to pick-pocketing and petty theft, had been hanging), and signed into law New York's gradual emancipation act of 1799.

Jay's greatest contributions, however, came in the realm of foreign policy. From October 1779 to May 1782, Jay was America's representative in Madrid, where his hat-in-hand solicitation of aid fell flat. But the experience prepared him for a more important role, that of chief architect of the 1783 Treaty of Paris. Arriving in France to join the octogenarian Benjamin Franklin, long beloved of the French and similarly enamored of them, Jay added a tough-minded counterweight to Franklin's complaisant negotiating posture. (Here one might note—and I think Stahr underplays this—Jay's lifelong aversion to the country that had expelled his ancestors and the religion for which it stood.) Jay insisted on decoupling the American mission's negotiating efforts from the policy of a French government nominally friendly but actually interested in ensuring that the fledgling North American republic not be too strong. The resulting treaty gave the United States all the land it had dared dream of acquiring, including a western boundary at the distant Mississippi River, which was exactly what Jay had insisted on.

In 1795, President Washington's faith in Jay's diplomacy was requited with the so-called Jay Treaty. Chief Justice Jay, sent to England to negotiate a resolution to outstanding difficulties between the United States and the United Kingdom, failed to win unfettered American access to British ports or to obtain a halt to British naval impressments of U.S. citizens. The Jeffersonian Republican opposition, as was its wont, made the perfect the enemy of the good and condemned the treaty: Jay said he could have traversed the country from north to south by the light of his own burning effigies. In reality, however, while Jay had not pulled off another marvel akin to that of 1783, the treaty of 1795 did provide the promise of lasting peace with Britain along with some commercial concessions. Specialists have come to recognize that Jay likely got all that the British were of a mind to give—as the difficulties of Jefferson's own presidential administration were soon to show.

Jay also had a hand in drafting the most significant statement of foreign policy left by the revolutionaries, George Washington's Farewell Address. The text ultimately presented to the public as Washington's, with its counsel that America steer clear of entangling alliances, and thus of foreign wars, actually owed its genesis to a collaboration between the president, Alexander Hamilton, and Jay.

Perhaps Jay is best remembered today as the first chief justice of the United States. He already had extensive experience as a state judge by the time he joined the United States Supreme Court, which may explain why he passed up the opportunity to serve as secretary of state, the post Washington apparently had in mind for him. Jay had earlier turned down the prospect of high executive office in New York because he thought he could be of more service in the judiciary, and he did the same when the federal government was inaugurated in 1789.

Stahr presents all of this in workmanlike fashion. He relies on the Jay papers for most of his information, and one has

the feeling that the papers control him more than he controls them. Seldom does he stop to describe the personality of any of his cast or indeed to provide much by way of context at all. Thus, fascinating figures such as Gouverneur Morris, Hamilton, and Ben Franklin come and go without the reader having seen much in them other than a person Jay encountered. If "Founders Chic" has pulled the leading Revolutionaries down off their pedestals to make them interesting people with everyday foibles and concerns, Stahr's Jay is still essentially bloodless.

The problem is not entirely Stahr's fault. Jay was not a military hero, and he did not invent bifocals or write the first draft of the Declaration of Independence. He was far more interested in doing something in public office than in holding office for its own sake. Part of the reason for his unfamiliarity today is that Jay did not serve as president, while less able men of his generation—James Monroe certainly, probably John Adams, perhaps even Thomas Jefferson—did. As secretary of foreign affairs from 1783 to 1789, Jay was the most significant executive officer of the United States, but alas for his reputation, that was under the Articles of Confederation. Not many plaudits accrue to him for having been essentially, as John Kaminski puts it, "prime minister" of the country during the post-war period.

Jay's prime years were devoted to politics, but he had other interests as well. So, for example, we learn from Stahr that he introduced Gilbert Stuart to other members of the federal elite, for which American art historians as well as political historians owe Jay a debt of gratitude.

He spent his retirement (1801-1829) as a widower, his wife having died just as his second term as governor—the last public office he held—expired. While superintending his farm, he gave special attention to the reorganization of the Episcopal Church; he noted that he did not think anyone's salvation would be decided by whether there was an Episcopalian bishop in his jurisdiction,

which marked him as a rather moderate Episcopalian. He also supported the American Bible Society, a charity that his son had helped to organize devoted to giving away copies of the Scriptures.

James Fenimore Cooper, perhaps the 19th century's most popular American novelist after Mark Twain, as a youngster listened to many tales on the porch of Jay's Westchester County farmstead; from that experience came the best-seller *The Spy*. Stahr notes that the CIA remembers Jay as America's first counterintelligence chief, and Cooper's tale is based on Jay's Revolutionary War experiences.

Besides this, Jay, like Morris and Hamilton, was a founding member of the New York Manumission Society. His son, Judge William Jay, would play a prominent role in abolitionism, and John loaned his famous name and prestige to the cause, which of course he had given a boost when as governor he had signed the 1799 gradual abolition act. As Stahr notes, Jay did own slaves, but he was admirable in working to bring the institution to an end. In 1819, he was found ranged opposite his former friend Jefferson on the Missouri issue.

All of this is very interesting, but what there is of it here is shoehorned into a potpourri final chapter without a clear focus. Upon completing that chapter, one has the feeling of not really having gotten to know Jay very well by reading Stahr's book. His contribution to *The Federalist* should have been given more attention, as should Jay's primary role in securing New York's ratification of the U.S. Constitution. Historian Stewart Jay's work on Jay's chief justiceship could have been employed to more advantage, as could William Casto's.

These are a specialist's quibbles. For the lay reader, what is important is that Stahr has produced a fitting biography of a great American. If it is not heartwarming, well, Jay was no John Adams; in the end, we can be glad for that. ■

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# Springtime for Democracy?



Here's a question I posed to a friend during a lively political dinner discussion in Gstaad, a Swiss ski resort frequented by rich people who would rather

shop than think: "Where has American military intervention brought on democracy? Vietnam, Somalia, Lebanon, Haiti, Iraq?" My buddy, Stanley Weiss, thinks more than he shops, so he took up my challenge and countered with, "the Dominican Republic, Grenada, most of Central America, and Kosovo." By now the Chateau Latour was taking effect, so I threw him a curve: "Do you dispute the fact that if there was a real election in Saudi Arabia, Osama bin Laden would win in a landslide?" "What's your point?" answered Stanley to my non sequitur.

My point was that military interventions do not work and that yet again the American people are being fed the big lie, on a par with Saddam threatening us with his WMD. We are being told that from Egypt to Iraq democratic forces are stirring and that the old order in the Arab world is cracking following Bush's forceful calls for democracy.

Let's start with Lebanon, where roars of "America Out" rise from the crowds counter-demonstrating against Bush's demands for Syrian troop withdrawal. Pro-Syrian supporters outnumber those who want the Syrians out almost 2-1, a fact that seems to have escaped the optimists inside the beltway. Sheik Nasrallah, Hezbollah's senior political leader and a man with fierce support among Lebanon's Shia community, litters his speeches with anti-American rhetoric. He denounces the UN resolution demanding Syrian withdrawal, charging that America and Israel are behind it. "The Syrian presence is not only military. ... Syria is in our hearts, our spirits and our souls. ... We are united here to above all thank Syria, the Syrian people and the Syrian army, which has stayed

by our side for many long years and is still with us." Pretty strong stuff coming from a Shi'ite about a Sunni country.

Lebanon is a made-up nation carved away from Syria by France during the 1920s as a Christian enclave. Muslim birthrates did the rest. There are 17 different sects of Muslims, Christians, and Druze. Anti-Syrian marchers are mostly Christian; pro-Syrians are mostly Muslims. A civil war reverting to old feuds is probable, although the pundits insist that the Lebanese have learned their lesson after the disastrous 1975-90 war.

Some lesson. The moment Syrian troops leave the country, human nature will revert to type. Mary Wakefield, an attractive young woman writing for the London *Spectator* from Lebanon, said that photographs coming from Beirut "have given Bush an excuse to use the sort of language that sounds better coming from Clint Eastwood ... as 500,000 Lebanese gathered in Riad el-Solh Square to protest against American interference, Bush ignored them entirely and spoke over their heads to the teenagers in the Place des Martyrs. 'All the world is witnessing your great movement of conscience. The American people are on your side. Millions across the Earth are on your side,' he told them." Wakefield commented, "It's an odd way to promote democracy in the Middle East—to ignore an eighth of the country's population."

Has Bush bothered to check the numbers in Lebanon? Or in Egypt, for that matter? Does he believe that Egypt's rubber-stamp parliament is going to oppose Hosni Mubarak if he seeks a fifth term? Or that the ruling party will run a fair election? *New York Times* columnist

David Brooks mistakes hopes for reality. He sees a free Mideast living in peace with its neighbors. Instead, the reality is that we are locked in a needless war that has incited Muslims the world over and has led to the deaths of more than 1,500 American soldiers and tens of thousands of innocent Iraqis.

How can anyone hope for peace when even the road to Baghdad airport is not secure, when the only plausible legal Egyptian candidate opposing Mubarak is still in jail, and when Saudi women are more likely to end in jail than be given a ballot? Who are these people kidding?

This brings me to Israel. As I wrote two issues ago, don't get your hopes up. While the Gaza settlements' dismantling is about to begin, the Knesset has set aside \$1 billion for resettlement. Many settlers plan to move—yes, you guessed it—to the West Bank, and at a very rapid pace. In fact, they are encircling East Jerusalem with settlements and roads only settlers can use.

Let's face it. As the long-awaited report into Israeli government support for illegal settlement outposts in the West Bank states, "There has been widespread state complicity, fraud and illegal diversion of government funds and illegal seizure of private Palestinian land." And before Abe Foxman or some punk at the *Weekly Standard* begins to charge anti-Semitism, the report was written by an Israeli, Talia Sasson, a former chief state prosecutor. It does not take a great intellect to surmise that Ariel Sharon is playing Bush like the proverbial fiddle as he continues to encourage illegal settlements on Palestinian lands.

Never mind. Democracy, like spring, is busting out all over the Middle East, but if I were you, dear readers, I would not plan a vacation anytime soon—at least not while holding an American passport. ■



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